In the last days of the 21st century and 10th century, the first mass-produced su-57 made by the communist city of the far east was making pre-delivery test flights, but the plane crashed out of control and the pilot made a parachute escape.
It was reported that the plane was at a height of 10000 meters to do high-speed test flight, telex flight control failure, in the final climb to 12000 meters, the plane into the stall tail rotation, unable to change, the pilot had to skydive. The plane climbed from 10000 meters to 12000 meters, which has two possibilities. One is the pilot's initiative to climb up after finding the fault, to buy time and height for troubleshooting; the other is the failure of the airspeed tube or angle of attack sensor, and the flight control system automatically makes a wrong response, which is a bit like the case of Boeing MCAS. The estimate is more likely to be the second case. If the pilot can still actively control the climb, there should be enough control to avoid entering the stall tailspin.
The other message was that it entered the downward spiral of the nose at an altitude of 8,000 metres, and that the third statement was that it entered the uncontrolled roll (and possibly the \"Dutch roll\" mistake) and was eventually forced to parachute at an altitude of 2,000 metres after the pilot cut into the rigid connection between the joystick and the rudder surface (i.e. not through the flight-controlled \"filter\" and \"isolation \") and attempted to restore stability by relying on the aircraft's own static stability.
This is more likely to be a problem where the pneumatic control surface is stuck, or the actuators on both sides are out of sync due to a failure. This is rare, but if there is a wiring error, it is likely. Su-57's pneumatic control rate is complex, such as low-speed rolling control through the aileron, but at high speed to switch to flat tail; high-out of the double-tail in the action needs to be correspondingly flat tail compensation; this does not consider the action of the movable sidebar. Some control surfaces deflect only when a particular action is combined, and wiring errors may appear when this mode is excited.
Of course, these are guesses, specifically waiting for a public accident investigation report, but it is estimated that this is a quality issue for the flight control system, including sensors and action mechanisms, rather than a design issue. Factory test is the acceptance before delivery, the test is routine flight action, and there is no need to exceed the user's use limit, that is, in the model test established in the absolute limit of the safety factor after the safety limit of the flight. User limits should not be exceeded in use, but they are not immediately catastrophic. Su-57 has been tested for a long time, the user limit should be reliable, the typical flight movements that have been tested repeatedly should be no problem, factory test flights do not need to do new flight movements, the first mass-produced aircraft after a long ordeal will avoid nothing, all test movements will follow the rules.
Su-57 is really a long grind, this fall is hungry Han diarrhea belly, to recover but not easy. But Su-57 can't fail. There is a saying that Su-57 is a misunderstood hero. Reality has repeatedly shown that whether Su-57 hero is still difficult to say, is not so much misunderstood, but full of helplessness.
In the West, Su-57 is dubbed \"Raptorsky,\" certainly suggesting that Russia\" copied again,\" and Su-57 is a Russian copy of the F-22. This is biased and even more misleading. Su-57 is different from F-22 in design orientation and F-22 in performance orientation. The Russian side claims half true and half false that 57 is 22 plus 35, so Su-57 is the sum of the F-22 and F-35. This is not a complete joke. Su-57's practice of focusing on air superiority in a top-of-the-line fighter requires air-to-air excellence in the first place, so the front-and-back central capsule is suitable for carrying not only a large number of air-to-air missiles, but also large open-air ammunition.
But paradoxically, and out of desperation, Su-57 is still empty-handed, but there is no clear goal in design, which is completely different from Su-27's requirement to overwhelm the F-15 in design, so it is meaningless to compare the performance item by item with that of a particular Western fighter. At the same time, Su-57 has different considerations for stealth and over-the-horizon operations. In anti-invisible aircraft combat, the need for Su-57 stealth enough to delay the other side's discovery, as long as the ability to enter a close enough distance, it is sure to defeat the opponent through good mobility; in the anti-invisible aircraft combat, it requires a long enough distance to snip at the other side, without the threat of the other side's counter-control.
Sujoy won the PAKFA bid in 2002, and the basic technical requirements were set before that. This is the ambiguous phase between Russia and the West. "The design of the new generation of fighter jets (PAKFAs) has been confronted with the difficulties that the Cold War did not have, that is, the design of the target and the need to catch up with the opponent," Mr. Simonoff, who was then the chief architect of Mr. Sujoy, said later. In other words, whether it's a lack of political necessity, or a lack of technical and economic "support,"the F-22 was not designed in the first place, and the three-and-a-half generations of the West (F-18E, European two winds, etc.) were only vague reference targets, and the bigger consideration might come from the continuation of Russian fighter technology and industry, after all, not "Su-27.”
PAKFA will not only provide a sufficiently sophisticated next-generation fighter jet, but it will also carry the heavy burden of reviving the bloody Russian aviation industry that has pulled off its muscles. Russia hasn't seriously designed a new fighter jet in 30 years, and after that, the team may be falling apart to the point that it won't close. Russia is now ordering Su-35S, Su-30SM, Il-76-90MDA, Tu-160M2 and so on, replacing existing fleets that are already ageing, and reinstating the rusty aviation industry to attract talent and restore capacity and supply chains. These were essentially Soviet aircraft that were only used for hand training, and were prepared for the production of a truly new generation of aircraft like the Su-57.
From the start, PAKFA has enjoyed strong support from Moscow, never lacking in funding or having problems with \"performance requirements creeping up\" from the Russian Air Force. On Sujoy's side, too, be careful and steady. There are two routes for fighter design: one is what is required to design what fighter's tactical leading route, the other is what technology designs what fighter's technical leading route. In fact, there is a third route: what is the cost of designing what fighter jet small business route. This is the basic technical route of Su-57. On the other hand, britain and france are such basic technical routes. Not to mention in the eyes of the world, russia itself has finally reduced itself to a \"second-class power\" such as britain and france, but this is another topic.
In the era of PAKFA, the transformation of key technologies, such as stealth, computerized design and manufacturing, from cool techs to ash technology, is a time of high investment to keep up with the situation, but it is also an era when the Russian aviation industry cannot open the pot, many key technical details that can determine success or failure cannot be discussed at all, and even the team and facilities are in the semi-recovery stage after the blood shock. Sujoy is no stranger to radical technology, but the difficulty now is that the road has to start from yesterday, the excessive emphasis on stealth is only to put the impossible requirements, so sue-27 research and development of the same strong wrist is tantamount to direct suicide, so the control of technical risk becomes the top priority. \"Stealth change to Su-27\" is the result.
But if the board is rotten and the lack of nails and tenons is not good enough to be careful. Su-57 has repeatedly encountered major setbacks in research and development. The parallel development of the \"project 30\" engine cannot keep up with the progress, first with the\" AL31 magic change \"117S transition, this is not a problem, this is in line with the risk control principle. However, the \"project 30\" progress is seriously behind schedule, the transition period may be greatly extended, hoping to avoid the embarrassment of concubine correction. But early test flights revealed the lack of strength of the body's design, forced to lash out at the patch, the overhaul of the late prototype's internal structure, and therefore to re-test, which is a major reason for the delay.
In avionics, the new generation of active scanning radar, distributed antenna, combat decision-making auxiliary system and other advanced system technology across too large, in the Su-35S first installed some key technology, in practice to improve, which is also in line with the principle of risk control. But because of the schedule and cost, the first Su-57 directly adopted the Su-35S system, which is actually downgraded than the original design.
In pneumatic design, the discussion of insufficient Su-57 stealth is numerous and no longer repeated; and the design of the central lift body is doomed to lead to the problem of separation difficulties in the delivery of weapons in the mid-line, which may lead to limitations in future use.
In terms of production and cost control, the two sides agreed to \"improve production efficiency and uniform specifications \"to reduce costs after the long-term sawing of the Russian joint aircraft company and the Ministry of Defence, which is generally thought to lower at least part of Su-57's immature high-fitting system to the mature system standard of Su-35S. This will be the production standard for the first batch of Su-57. But it doesn't seem to be low enough, and the first mass-produced Su-57 crashed during its test flight.
There is constant praise for russia's ability to make up for the so-called \"system advantage \"by integrating the system as a whole, rather than being wise. Subtle tactical cooperation may make up for the lack of personal skills, but fine, complex tactical cooperation actually leaves the door to crack, the basis of victory is far less solid and reliable than all the superb ball skills, the latter tactical choice and more room for contingency. The advantages of the system do not fundamentally solve the problem of missing doors, but simply shift vulnerability in different directions.
What's worse is quality. The problem may be in the assembly plant or in any part of the entire supply chain. In 2012, when one of vietnam's su-30s was about to be delivered on a factory test flight, the right-hand side of the lighting fell off due to a quality problem, causing the right hair to catch fire in the air after inhaling the inlet, forcing the pilot to skydive. Coincidentally, the pilot was the same person as the Su-57 crash. Fortunately, the Russian K36 series is worthy of being the world's best ejection seat, with superior technology and reliable quality, and has saved the lives of pilots in a variety of crash accidents since the 1980s, including at the Paris Air Show in 1989 and at the British Fairford Air Show in 1993, including the above-mentioned Su-30 and Su-57 crashes.
Also in the Soviet era, the quality of military products was not excellent, but it was generally impossible to have a big chain. The disintegration of the Soviet Union hit the Russian military industry in all directions and multi-level. From system and supply chain integrity to skilled technicians, engineers and managers;From production line order and discipline to quality control;In addition, the training of military personnel is abandoned, discipline is loose and all kinds of negligence. Losses are profound and spread across the military system:
The malfunction of the aircraft carrier -“ Kuznetsov during the Syrian operation forced the pilot to abandon the aircraft and parachute. During maintenance, the dock sank without causing the crane to collapse and damaged the deck. The electric welding spark caused a fire in the subsequent repair
These are high-vis accidents, and there are many more unknown, with 17 days of \"backfire\" bombers landing due to engine failure and 12 days of m-28 crash in december 2019 alone, possibly because of maintenance or quality. In fact, in recent years, the Chinese Air Force has also complained about the quality of the imported AL31 turbofan engine, which is another driving force for the fan 10\" Taihang \"series.
Russian military industry certainly has a bright spot,885\/885M \"Yassen\" class nuclear-powered attack submarine,995\/995A \"God of the North\" class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine is worthy of envy,\" pioneer \"hypersonic intercontinental missile has also entered service. Even Su-57, who performed well during Syria's \"actual-test \", at least without the triumphant claims of the United States and Israel to be far from locked in, and Su-57, who reportedly fought in East Gudha, only 40 kilometres from the Israeli-controlled Golan, could not be outside the full-time surveillance of Israeli air-defence radar. NATO's code name for Su-57 is \"Felon,\" although NATO's code name is\" randomly selected \", NATO's computers did not select such a vicious code even at the height of the Cold War.
However, China has also had a time to rely on bright spots to prop up national defense. This doesn't change the unfortunate reality that the three northern fronts face a possible flood of Soviet steel, mainly through flesh and blood. In fact, this is helpless, not the real bright spot. Russia, too, needs a systemic recovery. The problem is that it's hard to build a system from scratch, but it takes double the effort to stop slipping and recover. This is the same as land acquisition and renovation of old urban areas.
The crash of Su-57's first production plane could lead to a complete overhaul of Russia's supply chain for the aviation industry. This is no longer a \"key, bright spot\" solution. That would delay the substantial entry of Su-57, but Russia could not wait. Despite all the doubts, the pressure on the three-generation machine is self-evident. The U.S. Air Force is already heavily dressed for the F-35A, but has yet to deploy to Europe. European NATO allies have also begun to change. The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Italy and the United Kingdom are still far from Russia, and the threat is more indirect. The problem is that Poland has ordered 32 F-35As, and has suddenly pushed the threat to the door.
These 32 F-35As, of course, cannot be changed another time, but given the potential threat of Poland's feud with Russia and radical nationalism, coupled with the problems of Kaliningrad, the dispute over the eastern border, and the Russian ethnicities of the former Soviet Baltic States (about 25 per cent of the population of Estonia and Latvia, plus the greater share of the Belarusian population), the East Baltic Sea is Europe's biggest hot spot for the foreseeable future, and the Balkans and Ukraine are not turning over.
Unless it is part of a NATO offensive, Poland's F-35A is unlikely to go deep into Russia for a hunting-and-annihilating mission, but is a big threat to Kaliningrad and western Russia. Due to the relatively narrow battlefield, the F-35A speed is not a problem, but the F-35A stealth and networking, information capacity can cause great pressure on the Russian military air defense system. However, it is unacceptable that Poland should not be overwhelmed, politically, militarily, or culturally or democratically. Fall Su-57 must flutter wings to rise again,\" heavy criminals \"must wear crime meritorious service.